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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
School district consolidation has been a topic of debate 
in Iowa for decades. Since Iowa is, largely, a rural state 
there are many small school districts. In addition, the small 
districts and the large districts tend to have higher per 
pupil spending than the medium districts. Table 1 illustrates 
this point. 
Table 1. Total spending per pupil (excluding transportation 
costs) and number of school districts by average 
daily membership (ADM)^ 
ADM # OF DISTRICTS SPENDING PER 
PUPIL ($) 
0-249 58 3578.1 
250-399 86 3115.2 
400-599 93 2984.8 
600-999 96 2925.3 
1000-2499 71 2922.9 
2500-7499 24 3049.8 
7500- 8 3202.6 
^Secretary's Annual Report, 1986-87. Iowa Department of 
Education, Des Moines, Iowa. 
This table shows that nearly one-third of the school 
districts (grades K-12) have less than 400 pupils in average 
daily membership (ADM) and that over half are smaller than 600 
pupils. It also shows that the ADM category with the lowest 
per pupil spending has 1000-2499 students and that more than 
three-fourths of the school districts in Iowa are smaller than 
this. 
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Proponents of school district consolidation argue that 
small districts should be consolidated so that some of the 
available economies can be realized. Critics of school 
district consolidation, however, argue that these numbers do 
not take into account quality of school services and 
consolidation costs. 
Previous studies of school district consolidation 
To answer the question of whether school district 
consolidation will be beneficial a number of studies have been 
written. The studies were done both by economists and by 
experts in education finance and education provision. These 
studies did not reach a consensus with regard to the benefits 
(or lack thereof) of school district consolidation but they 
can be divided into two groups, those that concluded that 
consolidation is beneficial and those that concluded that 
consolidation is harmful. 
Studies that promoted school district consolidation tend 
to have one thing in common; they argued that increasing the 
number of students in a district will lower the cost per pupil 
in that district. However, they differed in the way they 
estimated the scale economies and the way and extent that they 
adjusted for other factors such as quality of school services. 
A paper by Webb [29] is an example of the simplest type 
of analysis. In his paper Webb used overall expenditure per 
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student and instructional expenditure per s "zudent for various 
enrollment categories to determine that the optimal enrollment 
category for Colorado school districts is 1500-2999 pupils. 
Webb's approach has some obvious drawbacks. One problem 
is that he did not take quality of schooling into account. 
School districts do not produce homogeneous products ; the 
quality of education provided can vary from district to 
district and if it varies in a systematic way with regard to 
district enrollment then consolidation may not be optimal. A 
second problem is with his use of enrollment categories to 
determine the optimal enrollment level. If enrollment 
categories are used, the conclusions are dependent on the 
choice of categories. In this case the optimal category could 
easily be misrepresented, with the endpoints off by hundreds 
of students. 
Numerous studies of the educational process have been 
done by Cohn [9,10,11] including an economy of scale study 
of Iowa high schools [93. The method used by Cohn is 
superior to that used by Webb. Cohn did account for quality 
in his study. He used the difference between twelfth grade 
and tenth grade average scores on the Iowa Test of Educational 
Development (ITED) as an index of quality. He assumed that 
the differences in average score would measure the gain in 
achievement provided by the school. 
Another way that Cohn improved on studies of the type 
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done by Webb is by using ordinary least squares (OLS) to fit a 
long run average cost curve. He compared a number of forms 
for the cost function and settled on a quadratic form as the 
appropriate one. A quadratic form is the common U-shaped cost 
curve with a distinct minimum. He estimated this minimum to 
be at an enrollment of 1500 pupils and that that is the 
"optimal" school size. 
There is one troubling aspect to Cohn's study, however. 
When he estimated the cost curve, the coefficient on his 
quality index was not significantly different from zero. 
There could be a number of reasons why this might occur. 
First, he could have an accurate measure of quality and 
quality is unrelated to the average cost of schooling. 
Intuitively, this does not seem to be likely. Another 
possibility is that he could have near multicollinearity in 
his independent variables. In his estimation equations he 
used various inputs (median teachers' salary, building value 
per student, course units, etc.) as independent variables. If 
any of these inputs were linearly related to the quality 
index, the estimator variances would be large and the 
likelihood of accepting the hypothesis that they were equal to 
zero would be increased. 
A final reason that the quality index might appear to be 
unrelated to average cost is that the index of quality may be 
a poor measure of actual school quality. Since the index is 
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the difference in average class scores it might be a poor 
index of quality if there were a significant amount of 
migration into or out of the school or if the dropout rate 
were large enough. Because of the small size of most of the 
schools in Iowa it would not take large changes in enrollment 
to affect the scores. It's impossible to know which of the 
arguments is correct; however, it seems more likely that there 
is an error in method than that there is no relationship 
between average cost and quality. 
Research done by Forsythe, Yanagida, and Johnson [13] 
deals with quality in a different manner. They constructed a 
quality index from a number of quality proxies in order to 
have a singular measure of school district quality. The 
proxies they used to construct their index are pupil-to-
teacher ratio, number of credit units offered, average teacher 
salary, percent of class units taught by properly endorsed 
teachers, pupil-to-specialist ratio, and the percent of 
students successfully completing the 12th grade. The quality 
index was constructed by calculating the mean value for each 
of the proxies and then, for each district, assigning a value 
of zero to each of the proxies associated with less quality 
than average and a value of one to those proxies associated 
with higher than average quality. These values were then 
summed for each district with the quality index represented by 
the total. The quality index has a range of 0 to 6. 
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Forsythe, Yanagida, and Johnson used this quality index 
in their estimation of an average total cost curve for school 
districts in eastern Nebraska. The functional form they chose 
included average daily attendance (ADA) and 1/ADA as 
independent variables. This resulted in a nonsymmetric U-
shape. Per-pupil total costs were found to be minimized at 
1122 students - but, because the shape of the cost curve was 
relatively flat around the minimum, the significant economies 
of scale were attained by about 400 students. Also, the 
coefficient on the quality index was positive and 
significantly different from zero giving support to the 
hypothesis that providing higher quality educational services 
is more costly than providing educational services of low 
quality. 
There are two potential problems with the quality index 
used by Forsythe, Yanagida, and Johnson, however. The first 
problem is that assigning values of zero and one to the 
individual proxies based on whether they are above or below 
average makes no allowance for the magnitude of the deviation 
from average. For example, a school district that was 
slightly above average in each category would receive a six as 
its quality index (the highest score possible) and would rate 
higher than a district that was the best in five categories 
but slightly below the mean in one category. 
A second potential problem with their index is that each 
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of the proxies is given equal weight in determining the 
overall index. It would be only a coincidence if each of the 
proxies were of the same value in producing an educational 
service. A better quality index would be one that took into 
account the relative importance of various factors in the 
production of educational services. 
In other research White and Tweeten [30] attempted to 
determine the optimal school district size for Oklahoma. They 
improved on other studies by allowing the optimal district 
size to vary with quality level. The Cohn and the Forsythe, 
Yanagida, and Johnson studies used a quality index as an 
independent variable in their estimation of the average cost 
curve. Because of this, quality was a "shifter" and by 
construction did not allow the optimum to vary with quality 
level. On the other hand, White and Tweeten divided the 
districts into three distinct groups based on the 
extensiveness of their curriculum. They then estimated 
separate average cost curves for each group. 
White and Tweeten found that districts with more 
extensive curricula have higher average costs and that the 
optimal district size increases as the curriculum becomes more 
extensive. They modeled the per-pupil total costs as a 
quadratic function of ADA and found the minimum average cost 
level to range from 5 50 to 900 pupils depending on the 
curriculum level. While estimating separate cost curves for 
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various levels of quality is an improvement on other studies, 
their research could be improved upon by using a better 
estimate of school district quality than merely breadth of 
curriculum. 
The papers reviewed above represent a sample of the work 
done on optimal school district size and in support of school 
district consolidation. Of course, there would be no 
controversy if there were no detractors. Numerous papers have 
been written either in outright opposition to consolidation or 
to argue that the actual savings alluded to in studies of 
scale economies is overstated. 
In a study of New Jersey school dis'cricts Walburg and 
Fowler [28] concluded that the past consolidation of school 
districts "may have been a move in the wrong direction." They 
based their conclusion on achievement score data from grades 
3, 6, and 9. They regressed these scores on socioeconomic 
status (SES), expenditure per pupil, and enrollment and found 
SES to have a significant and positive relationship to test 
scores, expenditure per pupil to have no effect on test 
scores, and enrollment to have a significant and negative 
relationship to test scores. In addition, in support of their 
conclusion they divided the school districts into twelve 
enrollment level categories and showed that five of the six 
smallest categories have above-average scores, whereas all six 
of the largest categories have below-average scores. This is 
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the evidence that led them to the conclusion that New Jersey-
is over-consolidated and that consolidation may be detrimental 
with regard to quality. 
While their conclusions may be correct for New Jersey, 
care must be taken when applying Walberg and Fowler's 
conclusions to other states. Since New Jersey is an urban 
state with large school districts, consolidation may mean 
something entirely different than it does in a small rural 
state like Iowa. For instance, the smallest six enrollment 
categories in the Walberg and Fowler study include districts 
of 36 to 3900 students. While five of these six categories 
are above average in terntis of test scores, the smallest and 
largest categories of the six have nearly the same score and 
there is no discernible trend in scores over this range. In 
Iowa these six enrollment categories would include well over 
ninety percent of the school districts, so the conclusion that 
consolidation of districts may lead to lower test scores may 
not be applicable to Iowa or other rural states. 
Other research argued that the savings from consolidation 
purported by studies of scale economies is not realizable 
since consolidation is different from adding students to an 
existing district structure. For instance, a paper by Coleman 
and LaRocque [12] argued that the higher per pupil costs 
associated with small school districts are due to lower pupil-
to-teacher ratios. Because teacher costs are such a large 
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proportion of total costs, the rate at which teachers are 
•utilised (the pupil-to-teacher ratio) significantly affects 
per pupil total costs. They further argued that consolidation 
of small districts with large ones won't result in any total 
savings but will merely spread the higher costs of the smaller 
district over a larger base of students. They did concede 
that savings can occur from reduced administrative costs, but 
they argued that administrative costs are such a small part of 
the overall budget that any savings would be insignificant. 
The conclusions of Coleman and LaRocque are correct for 
the districts that they considered. Their study was done for 
British Columbia, Canada and considered the potential benefits 
from the consolidation of the smallest 20 school districts in 
that province. These districts, however, are remote and 
consolidation offers no reduction in the number of attendance 
centers or in the number of staff members. Consequently, no 
savings would accrue due to consolidation. 
The problems associated with school district 
consolidation in British Columbia are not found everywhere 
that consolidation is being considered. Therefore, the 
conclusion that consolidation is not beneficial cannot be 
generalized to all locales. 
Research by Holland and Baritelle [20] provided further 
evidence that the consolidation of school districts may not be 
universally beneficial. They used a separable programming 
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approach to determine optimal school districts for a single 
county in the state of Washington. They concluded that 
savings from consolidation would be approximately 1.3% and 
that this was too small to justify consolidation. 
Holland and Baritelle conceded that scale economies do 
exist for the districts in the study and that all districts 
were currently operating below capacity. However, they argued 
that the county was sparsely populated enough that 
consolidation would result in increases in explicit 
transportation costs nearly as large as the savings from more 
intensive utilization of other resources. 
In a study of California school districts Kenny [22] 
found that the existence of scale economies was not sufficient 
to conclude that consolidation should take place. Kenny's 
paper was the only one that showed the provision of 
educational services within a typical cost minimization 
framework. His model showed that school providers, acting 
optimally, would act to provide educational services at a 
level where increasing returns exist. Because of this, the 
existence of scale economies does not imply consolidation is 
necessary but neither does it imply that consolidation will 
not be beneficial. 
To summarize, the studies of school district 
consolidation that have been done to date have fallen into two 
groups, those that support consolidation and those that refute 
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the consolidation advocates. The studies that support school 
district consolidation use the existence of scale economies 
as support for their argument. Most of these studies attempt 
to make adjustments for school district quality and they do so 
in a number of ways. The most common methods used are to use 
test scores or input characteristics as proxies for quality or 
to construct an index from test scores or input 
characteristics. In addition to the research reviewed here, 
Fox [14] has done an extensive review of school economies-of-
size research, and generally district level studies have 
concluded that size economies do exist. 
The case against school district consolidation is made in 
a number of ways. One argument is that consolidation will 
lower the quality of educational services. Another common 
argument is that the savings implied by scale economies 
research is not fully realizable. Usually, remoteness or 
population sparsity are cited as reasons why transportation 
costs may rise to offset the savings from consolidation. And 
last, Kenny [22] has argued that the mere existence of scale 
economies is not sufficient to imply that school districts are 
too small and should be consolidated. 
Statement of purpose 
The dichotomy in the research on school district 
consolidation, in addition to the continued public debate on 
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the matter, leads to the conclusion that further research in 
the area is needed. Improving on the current state of 
research in the field in order to make more informed policy 
decisions is the purpose of this study. 
The main problem with the current research is that it 
tends to be evidence in support of a conclusion rather than 
the derivation of a conclusion from a sound theoretical and 
empirical base. This is a problem on both sides of the 
argument. The research in support of consolidation tends to 
use potential cost savings as an argument for consolidation, 
and the research against consolidation uses the analysis of 
specific cases to refute the existence of savings. Neither 
body of research begins with a theoretical model of 
educational service provision and uses it to derive a 
conclusion. 
Throughout the current literature the problem of school 
district quality is a concern. The problem is how to measure 
it and what happens to it when consolidation takes place. 
The purpose of this study is to advance the research into 
school district consolidation by using the theory of clubs to 
provide a theoretical basis to analyze the process of school 
district consolidation and to use a multiple-indicator, 
multiple-cause estimation technique to estimate school 
district quality along with other standard econometric 
techniques to predict the effects of school district 
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consolidation in general. 
This study will proceed in the following way. Chapter 2 
will outline the basic club good model that will be used 
throughout the study. Chapters 3 and 4 will adapt the model 
to the specifics of school district consolidation; Chapter 3 
will consider the effects of districts of constrained size and 
their merger, and Chapter 4 will consider the effect of state 
aid to school districts. Chapter 5 will be the empirical 
chapter including the estimation of school district quality 
and estimation of the efficient production of school services. 
Finally, Chapter 6 will discuss the implications of the 
estimation for the theoretical model and make generalizations 
about the process of consolidation and its predicted effect on 
efficiency and quality. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Introduction 
Goods and services can be classified with regard to their 
rivalry in consumption and their exclusivity. Classifying 
them over these two characteristics aids in determining what 
type of model is appropriate to analyze the provision of the 
good or service in question. 
Goods are exclusive if some individuals (usually 
nonpayers) may be kept from consuming them. School services 
are by nature exclusive since it is possible to keep some 
people from consuming the service. However, as a matter of 
public policy the public elementary and secondary schools do 
not exclude any individuals. Consequently, the issue of 
exclusion is not important in considering the provision of 
public school services. 
In terms of rivalry of consumption, goods and services 
can be grouped in three ways. The first group would be goods 
that are completely rival in consumption. Consumption of a 
rival good by an individual precludes all other individuals 
from consuming that particular unit of the good. On the other 
end of the spectrum are goods that are completely nonrival. 
These goods, once provided, may be consumed by anyone and 
everyone with each individual receiving the same amount of the 
good and with each additional consumer in no way diminishing 
the amount consumed by the others. 
16 
The third type of good lies in between these extremes and 
could be characterised as a congestible good. A congestible 
good is a good that can be consumed by more than one 
individual but is not completely nonrival in consumption. In 
other words, there is a facility that a number of people may 
use but each additional consumer produces some congestion that 
lessens the service received by the original consumers. An 
example of a congestible,good is a roadway. As traffic is 
increased on a fixed stretch of road congestion, occurs. As 
-cars are added noise increases, speed may decrease, and the 
likelihood of an accident increases; consequently, the 
addition of automobiles to the roadway imposes a cost on the 
drivers already on it. This additional cost manifests itself 
as reduced service to the users of the road. 
The provision of school district services can also be 
characterized as a congestible good. At a particular point in 
time a school district has employed a certain number of inputs 
(teachers, principals, school buildings, etc.). The level of 
service provided to the students and the community is not just 
a function of the amount of these inputs employed but also the 
number of students utilizing the inputs. Adding students to 
a particular level of inputs increases crowding, increases the 
pupil-to-teacher ratio, and decreases the quality of the 
educational service provided. 
The provision of school district services should be 
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modelled as a congestible good. 
Local public service provision framework 
Congestible goods have a number of different names in the 
economics literature. They are referred to at various times 
as congestible goods, mixed goods, local public goods or 
services, and club goods. The club goods title is generally 
associated with goods that are excludable and the other names 
are used with goods whether excludable or not. 
The current literature in this field has its beginning in 
a classic paper by Tiebout [27]. Tiebout's paper was a 
response to earlier work in the area of pure public goods 
(both nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption). He argued 
that the conclusions about the provision of pure public goods 
did not necessarily hold for goods provided by local 
governments. Since the seminal paper by Tiebout, much has 
been done to explain the efficient provision of local public 
goods and services and club goods. Many papers design a 
rigorous framework for Tiebout's exposition and then use it to 
explain and expand Tiebout's conclusions and, in some 
instances, to investigate other relevant characteristics of 
club good or local public good provision (Adams and Royer [3], 
Adams [1,23, Allen, Amacher and Tollison [5], Buchanan [8], 
McGuire [23], and Oakland [24], for instance). 
Most studies of efficient provision of local public goods 
and club goods will use, at least, the assumptions made by 
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Tiebout: 
1. Consumer-voters are fully mobile and will move 
to that community where their preference patterns, 
which are set, are best satisfied. 
2. Consumer-voters are assumed to have full 
knowledge of differences among revenue and 
expenditure patterns and to react to these 
differences. 
3. There are a large number of communities in which 
the consumer-voters may choose to live. 
4. Restrictions due to employment opportunities are 
not considered. It may be assumed that all persons 
are living on dividend income. 
5. The public services supplied exhibit no external 
economies or diseconomies between communities. 
6. For every pattern of community services set by, 
say, a city manager who follows the preferences of 
the older residents of the community, there is an 
optimal community size. 
7. The last assumption is that communities below 
the optimum size seek to attract new residents to 
lower average costs. Those above optimum size do 
just the opposite. Those at an optimum try to keep 
their populations constant [27]. 
When considering the provision of school services in Iowa some 
of these assumptions seem quite unrealistic. In particular, 
because Iowa is largely a rural state, many people are tied to 
specific localities due to their jobs, and there does not 
exist a large number of communities within commuting distance 
from those jobs. Because of these limitations, school service 
provision in Iowa is a special case of local public service 
provision where mobility is limited; therefore, school 
district size (number of students) is constrained. 
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The first part of the theoretical discussion considers an 
unconstrained model, however. The unconstrained model is 
closely related to that of Adams and Royer [3] and Adams [1,2] 
and has some characteristics of a model described by McGuire 
[23] . 
Education can be provided at various service levels (Xs) 
with service level being dependant upon the amount of 
educational inputs purchased (X) and the number of students 
utilizing these inputs (N). The expenditure per student (E) is 
simply the price of the educational inputs (Px) multiplied by 
the quantity of purchased inputs divided by the number of 
students. The objective of the school decision-makers is to 
maximize the level of service with respect to the number of 
students and amount of inputs and subject to an exogenously 
determined level of average expenditure (E"). The constrained 
maximisation problem for the school administrators can be 
written : 
The first order conditions that follow from maximizing L with 
respect to X, N, and A are: 
L=Xe(%,N)t\[E»-PxX/N] 
aL/@X = @Xa/@X-XPx/N = 0 (1) 
3L/SN = @Xs/@N+XPxX/N2 = 0 ( 2 )  
@L/@X = E--PxX/N = 0 ( 3 )  
Dividing Equation 2 by Equation 1 reveals the service 
maximizing condition: 
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-SXa/.gN % X 
@Xm/3X N. 
This situation is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. 
In this diagram Xa is an isoservice locus that maximizes the 
quality of schooling for a fixed level of per student 
expenditure, E. Since educational service is a function of 
inputs and the number of students, (i.e., Xs=Xe(X,N)), the 
slope of the isoservice locus can be determined by totally 
differentiating the equation of service provision: 
dXw = (@Xm/@X)dX + (aXe/3N)dN. 
Because dXe=Q along an isoservice locus, the slope of the 
isoservice locus is: 
dX — _ @Xm/@N 
dN @Xs/@X. 
The isoexpenditure line is a ray from the origin that 
represents the utilisation rate of the inputs. Its slope can 
be determined by totally differentiating the expenditure 
equation; 
dE = (X/N)dPx - (PxX/N)dN + (Px/N)dX. 
Since dE=0 along an isoexpenditure line and Px is a parameter 
the slope of the isoexpenditure line is: 
m = X 
dN N. 
Consequently, at the point of tangency of the isoservice locus 
and the isoexpenditure line the necessary condition for 
service maximisation is met. This point is a point of 
technical efficiency; it is the optimal level of inputs and 
21 
X 
X* 
N* N 
Figure-1. A point of technical efficiency 
X 
TEL 
N 
Figure 2. The technical efficiency locus (TEL) 
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number of students for that level of service. In Figure 1, 
the optimal number of students is represented by N" and the 
required inputs are represented by X*. 
If service level is maximized for every possible level of 
per-student expenditure the resulting set of tangency points 
is the technical efficiency locus (TEL). This locus is shown 
in Figure 2. It could be positively sloped, negatively sloped 
or backward bending, and the nature of this locus will be the 
focus of the empirical estimation of Chapter 5. 
The service level and average expenditure chosen will 
depend upon the preferences of the community. Community 
members are assumed to have homogenous preferences. They 
receive utility from the educational service provided and from 
a bundle of private goods (Xr). Their utility function can be 
written as U'=U(Xe,Xr). Their income (y) can be spent on the 
private good or on the public service. Their budget 
constraint is : 
y = Pr-Xr- + aE 
where a represents the proportion of the number of students to 
the number of taxpayers (Nt) and Pr- is the price of the 
private good. For simplicity, let Xr- be the numeraire and 
Pr=l. The Lagrangian expression for the representitive 
individual's constrained utility maximization problem is : 
L = U(X3(X,N) .Xr-) + X[y - Xr - (aPxX)/N] 
The individual maximizes L with respect to X, N, and X^. The 
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first order conditions are: 
@L/@Xr = au/aXr - X = 0 ( 1 )  
@L/@X = (@U/@Xe)(@Xm/3X) -  (>vaPx) /N = 0  ( 2 )  
SL/aN = OU/0Xc4) OXb/SN)  +  ( A a P x X ) / N 2  =  0 (3) 
= y (aPx ) /N ( 4 )  
Dividing condition 3 by condition 2 reveals: 
_ @Xe/3N z X 
@Xe/@X N. 
In other words, the maximization of utility by the 
representitive individual and hence, the community, will occur 
at a level corresponding to a point on the technical 
efficiency locus. In fact, each affordable point along the 
technical efficiency locus maps into Xs and Xr- space to become 
the frontier of possible choices for the individual. Each 
point is a possible point of utility maximization depending on 
the utility function of the individual. 
Therefore, a representative individual's constrained 
utility maximization determines the optimal level of service, 
the optimal school district size, the optimal expenditure per 
student and the optimal level of input usage. This process 
is illustrated in Figure 3. The left panel shows the 
consumer's utility maximization problem with the individual 
choosing Xr- and Xs. The right panel shows levels of inputs 
and enrollment that are implied by the consumers choices. 
In this "Tiebout world" the community has the ability to 
encourage or discourage movement into the community by people 
X 
s s 
Figure 3. The consumer's maximization problem 
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with the same preferences and incomes and so guarantee the 
efficient provision of the local public good. In this world 
there are as many community types as there are types of people 
and there is the exact number of people available to insure 
the efficient provision of the local public good or service in 
each community. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Introduction 
The model presented in Chapter 2 is a general club good 
or congestible public good model. In order to use this model 
to describe the provision of school district services some 
modifications must be made. The first modification, and the 
subject of this chapter, is the elimination of the free 
mobility assumption. In most models of congestible public 
goods an optimal community or club size is guaranteed through 
the movement of members. However, in order for this 
assumption to hold individuals must have perfect mobility and 
a large number of choices of where to live. Since Iowa is a 
rural state and many of its citizens are tied to particular 
communities because of their jobs and/or farms it is 
unrealistic to assume that individuals have free mobility or 
many choices about where to live. Likewise, it is unrealistic 
to think that communities can set a service level and entice 
the optimal number of families to move to the community. For 
these reasons the general club model must be modified to allow 
for this additional constraint. 
A size-constrained model 
The modification of the general model is to consider the 
choices available to the school administrators and to the 
community when the number of students is no longer a choice 
variable. The problem for the school administrators becomes 
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an uninteresting one. Since the administrators are operating 
with a level of spending fixed, by the community's utility 
maximization and if the number of students is also 
constrained, the number of inputs to purchase and hence, the 
service levels are residuals. 
The administrator's constrained problem is illustrated in 
Figure k. Points along the vertical line from N represent the 
relevant service level and expenditure choices for the 
community, and once the expenditure level is chosen the 
administrator can only purchase the requisite number of 
inputs. 
X 
TEL 
Figure 4. The effect of an enrollment constraint 
The constrained optimization for the individual becomes 
L=U(Xs(X,N),Xr)+A[y-Xr-(aPxX)/N] 
where all variables are as previously defined. The first 
order conditions arc: 
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^ = au _ AaP* 
3X axs ax N 
a)L •" @U X 
S)Xr- aXr 
^ c y-Xr-(aPxX)/R 
These conditions yield the typical result that utility will be 
maximized where the marginal rate of substitution between X 
and Xr- is equal to the ratio of their marginal costs. The 
difference between this condition and the one illustrated in 
the previous chapter is that now there is the additional 
constraint of 
Graphically, the service level and expenditure 
combinations from Figure 4- can be mapped into Xr-, Xra space in 
order to illustrate the opportunities available to the 
community. Because of the additional constraint the new 
opportunity frontier must lie everywhere on or below the 
unconstrained one. The unconstrained frontier and the 
constrained one may share some points. They will share the 
vertical intercept since this represents a point where none of 
the service is purchased and so the community size makes no 
difference. They will also share points at any service level 
that has N as a technically efficient size. At points other 
than these the constrained opportunity set must lie below the 
unconstrained one because more must be spent to attain any 
particular service level when the size of the community is not 
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the efficient one. 
Figure 5 illustrates an enrollment-constrained 
opportunity set. The outer boundary (dotted line) represents 
the unconstrained boundary. The constraint on enrollment will 
make the community worse off unless they would choose to offer 
no service or a level of service that is technically 
efficient. 
X 
r 
y 
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s 
Figure 5. An enrollment-constrained opportunity set 
Figure 5 illustrates only one enrollment-constrained 
opportunity set. However, there are as many of these 
constrained boundaries as there are possible size constraints. 
The unconstrained boundary is the outer envelope of all the 
enrollment-constrained boundaries. 
School district consolidation and the TEL 
If the model outlined above accurately describes the 
provision of school district services, the process of school 
district consolidation is the movement from one constrained 
30 
level of enrollment to another. A movement from one 
constrained enrollment level to another does not necessarily 
make the community better off. Whether consolidation makes 
the community better off depends on the nature of the 
community's preferences and the nature of the map of 
constrained opportunity sets. 
X 
r 
X 
s 
Figure 6. Two constrained opportunity boundaries and two 
possible indifference curves 
Figure 6 shows two possible enrollment-constrained 
boundaries, ÏÏ.t and Ni», and two indifference curves from 
different preference sets, U, and Ua. If preferences are 
described by Ui, school district consolidation will make the 
community better off if Hi >Hj?> and worse off if N».a>Ni . On the 
other hand, if preferences are described by Ue school district 
consolidation will benefit the community when TTc!>5.» and the 
community will be worse off with consolidation if Nt>N£>. 
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Consequently, in order to draw conclusions about the effects 
of school district consolidation it is necessary to have 
information about a community's preferences and about the 
nature of the map of constrained opportunity boundaries. 
The nature of the technical efficiency locus reveals 
information about the map of constrained opportunity 
boundaries. As shown in Chapter 2, the affordable points on 
the TEL map into Xa.Xr space to form the unconstrained 
opportunity boundary. Each point on this boundary is 
associated with an optimal community size and the optimal size 
changes along it depending on the slope of the TEL. If the 
TEL is upward sloping, the optimal community size increases 
downward along the unconstrained frontier. If the TEL is 
downward sloping, the optimal community size decreases 
downward along the unconstrained frontier. If the TEL is 
backward bending, the optimal community size first increases 
then decreases downward along the unconstrained frontier. 
Finally, if the TEL is vertical, there is a single optimal 
community size along the unconstrained frontier. 
Since school district provision is provided in a size 
constrained world it is necessary to know how the constrained 
boundaries behave. Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 illustrate this 
for the four cases mentioned above. Because any constrained 
boundary is tangent to the unconstrained one at the point that 
corresponds to its constrained size, the constrained frontiers 
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will behave in a particular way depending upon the way the 
optimal community size changes along the unconstrained 
frontier and consequently, upon the slope of the TEL. 
Figure 7 illustrates two enrollment-constrained frontiers 
and the unconstrained frontier (broken line). Since the TEL 
is upward sloping, the constrained boundary associated with Nx 
represents a smaller enrollment constraint than the one 
associated with Ns». In this case small districts provide low 
levels of service most efficiently and large districts provide 
high levels of service most efficiently. Therefore, 
consolidation of two districts that are providing low levels 
of service may make them worse off and consolidation of two 
districts offering high levels of service may make them better 
off. 
Figure 8 shows the opposite case. Here the constrained 
boundary, Hi. , is associated with a larger enrollment than the 
one associated with Nk. In this case larger districts provide 
low levels of service most efficiently and small districts 
provide high levels of service most efficiently. A 
consolidation of districts offering low levels of service 
would be beneficial whereas a consolidation of high service 
providers may be detrimental. 
Figure 9 shows the case when the TEL is backward bending. 
In this case the constrained opportunity boundaries share two 
interior points with the unconstrained frontier and the small 
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districts provide high and low levels of service most 
efficiently with large districts providing average levels of 
service most efficiently. Consolidation would most likely be 
beneficial with districts of medium quality. 
Figure 10 shows the case of a vertical TEL. In this case 
there is only one optimal school district size and 
consolidation will be beneficial as long as the consolidation 
moves the districts closer to the optimal size. 
Because the likelihood of successful consolidation 
depends upon the nature of the relationship between the 
constrained opportunity boundaries, estimation of the TEL can 
provide some insight into this relationship and also the 
potential for beneficial consolidation of school districts. 
TEL 
*2 N 
Figure 7. The case of an upward sloping 
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Figure 8. The case of an downward sloping TEL 
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Figure 9. The case of a backward bending TEL 
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Figure 10. The•case of a vertical TEL 
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CHAPTER 4 
The effect of state aid 
A second modification to the general model that should be 
considered is the influence of transfers from outside the 
district in the form of monetary aid to the district. 
Previously, the model assumed that the service was fully 
funded by the locality; however, the district receives a 
substantial amount of funding from outside the district. 
Nearly all of these transfers comes from the state's school 
finance formula. The state finances these transfers through 
its own tax system but the transfers and the tax within a 
district are not related. Consequently, individuals don't 
associate an increase in their state taxes with an increase in 
school services. Within the model then the income referred 
to, y, is income net of state taxes. 
Iowa uses a foundation plan to finance school services. 
This plan is designed to equalize educational opportunity by 
providing relatively property poor school districts with more 
state money than property rich districts. The general form of 
the aid formula is : 
S = F - $5.40(V) 
where S is the state aid per pupil, F is the foundation level 
or the level of spending the state equalizes over, $5.40 is 
the minimum tax rate (per $1000 of property value) districts 
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must charge, and V is the property valuation per pupil. In 
addition there is a $200 minimum state aid allotment for rich 
districts that have an implied zero or negative state aid 
figure. 
The state aid formula results in different school 
districts receiving different amounts of state aid per 
student. When examining the choices made by individual school 
districts this disparity is irrelevant. What's important is 
the amount of state aid that is received by the district, and 
the manner in which it is distributed. 
The pertinent question is; what are the effects, if any, 
of state aid on the decisions of school administrators and 
community members? School administrators are interested in 
maximizing the school district quality subject to a fixed 
level of expenditure. The expenditure level is determined by 
the community and, in an unconstrained world, inputs and 
enrollment are choices. In a size-constrained world only 
inputs are a choice. The school administrator's choices in 
either model reflect the interaction between inputs and 
enrollment subject to the exogenously determined spending 
level. Because of this the school administrator's choices and 
the position of the technical efficiency locus are unaffected 
by the source of the money. 
The decisions by community members are affected by the 
state aid, however. A representative individual's budget 
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constraint becomes : 
y + aS = Xr- + aPx/N. 
The addition of state aid will not affect the individual's 
desire to be maximize utility on the opportunity boundary. It 
will affect the location of that boundary, though. 
Figure 11 shows the effect of the state aid payment when 
enrollment is not constrained and Figure 12 shows the effect 
of state aid in a size-constrained model. In both figures the 
choices made reflect an assumption that both the private good 
and school services are normal goods. 
The shift outward in the opportunity boundary reflects 
the new higher spending levels afforded by the state aid. On 
the left side of both figures the affordable expenditure 
levels were associated with those levels between 0 and Es. 
After state aid is received a new maximum spending level, Ea, 
is achievable. Because of the constraints placed on state aid 
the minimum spending level in both cases is now Ei. The new 
opportunity boundary in Figure 11 is the TEL up to Es mapped 
into Xs, Xr- space. The new enrollment-constrained 
opportunity frontier in Figure 12 results from mapping the 
input-expenditure combinations along R up to Ea into Xa, Xr 
space. 
The dotted portion of the after-aid opportunity 
boundaries reflect constraints imposed by the state on the 
district. The first constraint is that the state aid be spent 
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on school services and the other is that the district provide 
at least the funding guaranteed by the $5.40 tax levy. A 
corner solution, utility maximization at the level of service 
implied by the $5.40 level, is a possibility; however, in Iowa 
all school districts are levying taxes higher than this 
level.* 
Modifying the model to include state aid has implications 
when considering school district consolidation. To 
effectively comment on the effects of consolidation it is 
necessary to take into consideration combining districts with 
equal property valuation per pupil and state aid payments. It 
is necessary also to consider the consolidation of districts 
with differing property valuation per pupil and state aid per 
pupil. 
' According to information received from the Iowa 
Department of Management the lowest school district levy for 
1986 was $5.65 per thousand for Okoboji school district and it 
was the only district below $7.00. 
X 
TEL 
N 
X 
r 
X 
s 
Figure 11. State aid in an unconstrained model 
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Figure 12. State aid in an enrollment constrained model 
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CHAPTER 5 
In Chapter 3 it was shown that, in order to make 
predictions about the effects of consolidation, the nature of 
the technical relationship in the production of school 
services must be known. In particular knowing the slope of 
the technical efficiency locus provides information about the 
pattern of the constrained opportunity boundaries. 
Unfortunately, economic theory does not allow a judgement 
to be made about this slope. Therefore, this relationship 
must be estimated using the data at hand. 
Estimating the slope of the technical efficiency locus 
poses a problem, however. Since the school districts are 
operating in a constrained world with regard to size, it is 
unlikely that they are operating at points along the technical 
efficiency locus. Consequently, no observations on the 
technical efficiency locus are available directly. However, 
inferences about the locus can be made. 
In order to make inferences about the technical 
efficiency locus it's useful to realize that any iso-service 
locus can be mapped into average expenditure and enrollment 
space. This situation is illustrated in Figure 13. The 
result is a constant-service average expenditure curve with a 
minimum at the same enrollment level as the technically 
efficient point on the iso-service locus. If a series of 
constant-service average expenditure curves is estimated. 
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Figure 13. Constant service average expenditure curve 
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their minima will represent the characteristics of the 
technical efficiency locus. 
Estimation of constant-service average expenditure curves 
requires that it be possible to quantify school district 
service or quality. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are a 
number of ways this is done in the literature. However, this 
study does something different. Quality is modelled as an 
unobservable variable. The multiple-indicator, multiple-cause 
model is used to estimate school district quality. 
Estimation of school district quality 
Estimating unobservable variables has been discussed at 
length by Zellner [31], Goldberger [17,18], Joreskog and 
Goldberger [21], and Robinson [26] among others and applied 
by Robins and West [25], Becketti and Hakkio [6], and Gertler 
[15,16], Specifically, the model to be estimated for school 
district quality is: 
yi = aio + ai 1 y* + 6i s + lai (1) 
y m = aeo + asa 1 y"' + Ôaîî s + Ufâ ( 2 ) 
y* = J3o + fît XJ. + . . . + B,-, X,-. + e (3) 
where y» and ya are indicators of school quality, y* is the 
unobservable school quality variable, s is an index of 
socioeconomic status, the xs are causes of school quality, and 
the p-s and e are disturbances. It is assumed that E(#)=0, 
E(e)=0, E('nvi'')=02, E(ee')=a2, E(%y*)=0, and that 
E( ex') =E( eu' ) =E(XVL' ) =E( sp.') =0 . After substituting Equation 3 
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into Equations 1 and 2, the reduced form becomes : 
yi = a:io + an (i3o + Xi + ... + fî,-, x,-, + e)+ 6i s +Uj. (!') 
ye = Cteo + arai{i3o + 13i Xi + . . . + J3n x.-, + e)+ 6a s (2*) 
The variance-covariance matrix for the above system is: 
S2 = aa^a' + ©2 
where a is a 2x1 column vector of the quality coefficents. 
Assuming that the error terms are distributed normally 
and that the x vectors are fixed and measured without error, 
the log of the likelihood function, except for the irrelevant 
constant term, has been shown by Joreskog and Goldberger [21] 
to be 
L = -N/2 (log 101 +  t r ( Q ~ ' W ) }  (4) 
where N is the sample size and W is the sample variance-
covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals. The model is 
estimated using full-information maximum likelihood, as 
recommended by Aigner et al. [4]. 
The data 
The estimation outlined above requires a cross-sectional 
data set of observations on school districts. Observations of 
indicators, causes, and a socioeconomic variable are needed to 
estimate school district quality, and average expenditure is 
needed to estimate the constant-service average expenditure 
curves. 
Past research on educational production provides insight 
on the variables that are used for causes (inputs) and 
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indicators (outputs). Hanushek [18] and Bridge, Judd, and 
Moock [7] provide lengthy reviews of this literature. The 
causes used are, generally, limited to what is available to 
the researcher from the relevant state Department of 
Education. Typically, researchers use variables to proxy the 
quality of teachers (teacher education, experience, and 
average salary), the utilization rate of staff (pupil-to-
teacher ratio, class size, and pupil-to-specialist ratio), the 
quality of curriculum (course units and course breadth), and 
the physical investment in the schools (school building value 
and number of library books). By far, the most used indicator 
of a school district's output is some type of standardized 
test score. 
For this study, the indicators of school district quality 
are test scores provided by the Iowa Testing Center. The 
Center has provided an achievement index compiled from the 
scores on The Basic Skills Test administered to students in 
grades 3 through 8. In addition, 1986 Iowa Test of 
Educational Development scores have been provided for high 
school students. These are district composite scores. Also, 
the Center has provided an index of socioeconomic status 
compiled from census data on income and education. 
The data on quality causes and school district 
expenditure have been provided by the Iowa Department of 
Education from the 1985-8 7 Secretary's Annual Reports and the 
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Basic Education Data Survey. Variables included in the data 
set are expenditures, average daily membership, FTE teachers, 
FTE administrators, course units, teacher experience, teacher 
salary, and school building valuation. 
The variables used as causes, indicators, socioeconomic 
index, and expenditures are listed along with their means and 
standard deviations in Table 2. 
Maximum likelihood estimates of school district quality 
Table 3 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
model. The first estimates presented are for the indicator 
equations. Because the empirical implications of the model 
are invariant with respect to the multiplication of the 
quality coefficients by some constant and the division of the 
cause coefficients and a by the same constant or with respect 
to the addition of a constant to J3o and the subtraction of a 
times that constant from Oo the model must be normalized to 
identify the parameters, determine a scale for y* and uniquely 
determine the parameters (Robins and West [25]). This is done 
by setting the constant and the quality coefficient in 
equation 1' equal to zero and one. 
The signs on the parameters in the indicator equations 
are as might be expected. Quality seems to have a positive 
and significant effect on test scores as does socio-economic 
status. 
The signs on the parameters in the cause equation are as 
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations of variables 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Causes 
Average daily membership 1088.02 
(Students) 
Pupil to teacher ratio 14.54 
Pupil to administrator ratio 196.91 
Course units 54.58 
Average teacher experience 13.01 
(Years) 
Average teacher salary 19805.60 
(Dollars) 
Facilities valuation per pupil 8431.93 
(Dollars) 
Indicators 
Achievement index 62.94 
Eleventh grade ITED scores 18.6 9 
Other variables 
Index socio-economic status 92.93 
Average expenditure per student 3095.73 
2271.76 
2 . 2 6  
56. 00 
20. 29 
2.58 
2497.56 
3153.62 
3. 28 
1, 57 
3.88 
454.40 
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Table 3. Maximum likelihood estimates of school district 
quality, N=387 (t-values in parentheses) 
Indicator equations 
a.a a 
Achievement . 2338 
(5.36) 
Grade 11 ITED scores .0255 
(.007 ) 
.2211 
(3.06) 
.1029 
(5.30) 
Cause equation 
Constant 36.46 
9.54) 
Average daily membership .000450 
(-2.92) 
Pupil-teacher ratio -.18861 
(-1.49) 
Facility valuation per pupil .000112 
(2.17) 
Average teacher salary . 0 0 0 2 6 2  
(2.17 ) 
Course units .01678 
(-.99) 
Teacher experience .21178 
(2.69) 
Pupil-administrator ratio -.000278 
(-.063) 
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might be expected with the exception of the coefficient on 
course units. One possible explanation for the negative sign 
rather than the expected positive sign is that the number of 
course units is closely linked to the number of students in 
the district and that this effect wipes out any beneficial 
effect of additional course units. In addition, the 
coefficients on ADM, facility valuation per pupil, average 
teacher salary, and average teacher experience are 
significantly different from zero at the .05 level. The 
coefficient on pupil to teacher ratio is significantly 
different from zero only at the .15 level and the coefficients 
on number of course units and pupil to administrator ratio are 
not significantly different from zero. 
To judge model adequacy the model was re-estimated 
without the restrictions implied by the multiple-indicator, 
multiple-cause model. The two models were then compared and a 
test statistic, twice the log of the likelihood ratio, was 
computed. This statistic is asymptotically distributed as 
chi-square with six degrees of freedom and was equal to 
11.998. The hypothesis that the restrictions on the model 
implied by the MIMIC model were valid was accepted at the .05 
level of significance. 
The index of aualitv 
The coefficient estimates for the cause equation and the 
characteristics of each district were then used to determine a 
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quality index for each school district. This "predicted" 
\ 
quality index had a mean of 4-1.15 and a standard deviation of 
1.33. The districts were ranked on this index and divided 
into five groups to determine if the various levels of quality 
had an effect on the nature of the average expenditure curves. 
Descriptive statistics for the five groups are listed in the 
appendix. 
Estimation of average expenditure curves 
Three different average expenditure curves were estimated 
for each of the five quality levels. For every model and 
every quality the dependent variable used was per-pupil 
expenditure not including transportation costs. The three 
functional forms are the most common forms used in the 
literature of school district cost estimation. The first and 
third models both include 1/ADM (ADMI) as an explanatory 
variable and the first also includes ADM on the right-hand 
side. The difference between the two is that the first model 
will reach a minimum and turn up, in terms of average 
expenditure, while the third model will decline continuously 
as ADM increases. The second model is the "typical" quadratic 
form that includes ADM and the square of ADM (ADMSQ) as 
explanatory variables. The three different models were 
estimated for each quality level so that a judgement can be 
made, not only about the minima, but also whether the 
structure of the average expenditure curve differs from 
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quality level to quality level. 
The results of the ordinary least squares' estimation of 
the constant-service average expenditure curves are presented 
in Table 4. In addition, a fourth model that included ADM, 
1/ADM, and ADMSQ was estimated. The results for this model 
are presented in the Appendix. Quality level one is 
associated with the 79 school districts with the highest 
predicted quality, quality level two is associated with the 8 8 
second-highest rated districts, quality level three represents 
the middle 90 school districts, quality level four represents 
the 97 school districts in the next-to-last group, and quality 
five represents the bottom 8 2 school districts. It's 
important to remember that the ratings are measures of 
relative position and that there aren't necessarily any "bad" 
school districts (or good ones). 
For each quality level the appropriate model seems to be 
the first one. This model has the highest R2 and each 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .05 
level and has the sign consistent with economic theory. An 
interesting point to note is that the R2 has a tendency to 
decline as quality declines. This means that the number of 
students becomes less important to the explanation of the 
variation in per pupil spending as quality level decreases. 
Average expenditure minima and the technical efficiency locus 
The estimated average expenditure curves can be used to 
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Table 4. OLS estimates of constant service average 
expenditure curves (t-values in parentheses) 
Quality level 1 
ADM 
ADMI 
ADMSQ 
Constant 
R2 
Model 1 
.44515 
(4.12) 
285120 
(11.8) 
2290.8 
(19.3) 
. 70 
Model 2 
-2.6253 
(-7.06) 
.00122 
(6.05) 
4207.7 
(31.9) 
.43 
Model 3 
214190 
(11.5) 
2731.7 
(47.9) 
. 63 
Quality level 2 
ADM 
ADMI 
ADMSQ 
Constant 
R2 
Model 1 
.49655 
(6.30) 
337460 
(19.1) 
2030.4 
( 2 2 . 6 )  
.83 
Model 2 
-2.1966 
(-5.75) 
.00084 
(4.80) 
4076.3 
(25.6) 
. 30 
Model 3 
266470 
(16.2) 
2527.2 
(48.6) 
. 75 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Quality level 3 
RDM 
ADMI 
ADMSQ 
Constant 
R2 
Model 1 
.31863 
(4.06) 
285420 
(11.6) 
2234.5 
(21.6) 
.  6 6  
Model 2 
-1.53 
(-4.58 ) 
. 0 0 0 6 0  
(3.75) 
3715.9 
(27.3) 
. 25 
Model 3 
216290 
(11.3) 
2611.0 
(53.7) 
. 59 
Quality level 4 
ADM 
ADMI 
ADMSQ 
Constant 
R2 
Model 1 
.15450 
(5.65) 
184310 
(11.0) 
2453.7 
(39.0 ) 
. 58 
Model 2 
-.49338 
(-6.01) 
.000115 
(5.73) 
3278.2 
(60.4) 
.28 
Model 3 
121000 
(8.48) 
2750.9 
(69.2) 
.43 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Quality level 5 
ADM 
ADMI 
ADMSQ 
Constant 
R2 
Model 1 
.03403 
(5.71) 
113280 
(7.48) 
2665.2 
(54.9) 
. 44 
Model 2 
.007137 
( .42) 
. 000000  
(.367) 
2966.4 
(72.8) 
.04 
Model 3 
71987 
(4.58) 
2838.0 
(63.3 ) 
. 21 
make inferences about the nature of the technical efficiency 
locus. Because the technical efficiency locus behaves in the 
same way as a locus of average expenditure curve minima, 
finding the minimum of each of the estimated average 
expenditure curves will provide an estimate of the nature of 
the technical efficiency locus. 
The minimum of each of the estimated average expenditure 
curves is simply the square root of the ratio of the 
coefficient on ADMI to the coefficient on ADM. This will be a 
minimum if the coefficient on ADMI is greater than zero. The 
minimum associated with each quality-constant average 
expenditure curve is presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Average expenditure curve minima by quality level 
Quality level Minimum 
(ADM) 
1 800 
2 866 
3 946 
4 1092 
5 1824 
Table 5 shows that as quality decreases the minimum of 
the average expenditure curve (in terms of ADM) increases. 
Likewise, the technical efficiency locus would behave in the 
same way. The implications of a downward sloping technical 
efficiency locus for school district consolidation is 
investigated in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Once the location and slope of the technical efficiency 
locus is estimated, judgments may be made as to the potential 
for successful consolidation. In this chapter the 
implications for consolidation will first be considered within 
the framework of the "typical" efficiency argument found in 
most of the literature. Next, the theoretical model developed 
in the Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will be used to show the 
conditions when consolidation will be successful. Finally, 
areas for further research will be discussed. 
School district consolidation for efficient production 
As discussed earlier, research that supports school 
district consolidation generally presumes that consolidation 
should take place in order to capture available scale 
economies. Previous research, however, doesn't allow for the 
efficient scale to vary with quality level. One of the ways 
the empirical results from Chapter 5 can be used is to provide 
information on the availability of scale economies by quality 
level in Iowa. 
Table 6 shows the predicted average expenditure (not 
including transportation) by school district ADM and quality 
level. These figures are the predicted expenditure levels 
calculated from the average expenditure functions (Model 1) 
estimated in Chapter 5. 
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Table 6. Predicted average expenditure (not including 
transportation) by ADM and quality level 
(Expenditure level in dollars per pupil.) 
Quality Level 
ADM 1 2 3 4 5 
100 5186 .52 5454 . 66 5120 . 56 4312 . 25 3801 .40 
200 3805 .43 3817 .01 3725 . 33 3406 . 15 3238 .41 
300 3374 .75 3304 . 23 3281 .49 3114 .42 3053 .01 
400 3181 . 6 6 3072 . 67 3075 . 50 2976 .27 2962, .01 
500 3083 .62 2953 . 60 2964 . 66 2899 , . 57 2908 , 78 
600 3033 .09 2890 . 76 2901, .38 2853 , .58 2874, ,42 
700 3009, .72 2860, .07 2865, , 28 2825 . ,15 2850. ,85 
800 3003, .32 2849, .47 2846, , 18 2807 . ,69 2834. , 03 
900 3008, .24 2852, , 25 2838 , 40 2797 . 54 2821. 70 
1000 3021. ,07 2864. ,41 2838 . 55 2792. 51 2812. 51 
1100 3039. , 67 2883. , 39 2844. 47 2791. 20 2805. 62 
1200 3062. 58 2907 . 48 2854. 71 2792. 69 2800. 44 
1300 3088. 82 2935. 50 2868 . 27 2796 . 33 2796. 58 
1400 3117 . 67 2966. 61 2884. 45 2801. 65 2793. 76 
1500 3148. 61 3000. 20 2902 . 73 2808 . 32 2791. 77 
1600 3181. 24 3035. 79 2922. 70 2816 . 09 2790. 45 
1700 3215. 27 3073. 04 2944. 07 2824. 77 2789. 69 
1800 3250. 47 3111. 67 2966. 60 2834. 19 2789. 39 
1900 3286. 65 3151. 46 2990. 12 2844. 26 2789. 49 
2000 3323. 66 3192 . 23 3014. 47 2854. 86 2789. 91 
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The enrollment level at which all scale economies are 
exhausted would be where each average expenditure function 
reaches a minimum as described by Table 5 in Chapter 5. 
However, as Table 6 shows, the average expenditure functions 
tend to flatten out as the minimum occurs. Because of this, 
if using the availability of scale economies as the criterion 
for recommending consolidation, it may be that transportation 
and transition costs will eliminate some of the savings that 
accrue from consolidating to the minimum of the average 
expenditure function. 
Of course, efficiency is not the only criterion that can 
be used to determine whether consolidation should take place. 
The theoretical model developed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 may be 
used to determine when school district consolidation may be 
beneficial or harmful to the community. 
School district consolidation within the club good framework 
When considering school district consolidation within the 
previously described theoretical framework there are three 
general cases that may be of interest. First, the case where 
the school districts are so small that before consolidation 
and perhaps even after it they have not attained an enrollment 
level near the technical efficiency locus. Second, the case 
where the district's enrollment level is near the technical 
efficiency locus before and after consolidation. And finally, 
the case where the district's enrollment is at or above the 
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relevant technical efficiency locus to begin with and 
consolidation would move them even farther from the locus. 
The third case will not be considered in this study, not 
because it is uninteresting, but because it is not relevant to 
the situation in Iowa. It is not relevant because there are 
relatively few large districts and there has been no 
controversy about their consolidation (or deconsolidation). 
In addition, the conclusion that the technical efficiency 
locus is downward sloping is valid for Iowa but may not be 
generalizable to states that have a "bigness" problem. 
The first case is probably the one most relevant to Iowa. 
Since the minima of the constant-service average expenditure 
curves (listed in Table 5) correspond to the technical 
efficiency locus, the technical efficiency locus is estimated 
to be downward sloping from quality level 1 at an enrollment 
level of 300 to quality level 5 at an enrollment level of 
1824. As Table 1 shows, well over half the districts in Iowa 
are not nearly at an enrollment level this high. In addition, 
these are the districts that have the most pressure to 
consolidate because of the potential savings that might accrue 
through lowered average expenditure. 
When will consolidation be optimal for these small school 
districts? The process of consolidation is the movement from 
one constrained opportunity set to another. When the district 
has an enrollment level smaller than the one associated with 
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any points on the technical efficiency locus, consolidation 
moves the district to an opportunity set higher than the 
previous one everywhere except at the vertical intercept. 
This situation is illustrated in Figure 14. The district 
described in this diagram is clearly better off than it was 
before consolidation provided it can attain the utility 
maximizing combination of private goods and school services. 
This is not guaranteed, however. Because it takes two 
districts to form a consolidation the characteristics of the 
other district are important in determining whether 
consolidation, will be beneficial. 
The simplest situation to consider is when the two 
districts are identical in every way. If the two districts 
are identical, Figrrxe shows how consolidation would not 
only make both districts better off but would result in a 
bundle of private goods and school services that both 
districts would consider optimal subject to the new enrollment 
constraint. On the other hand, if the districts differ in 
terms of income, property valuation per pupil, or state aid 
each district would face a different constrained opportunity 
set. It would be merely coincidence if the districts, through 
their own utility maximization, desired the same level of 
service after the consolidation takes place. Therefore, some 
compromise must take place. 
Figure 15 shows an example of this situation. The lower 
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Figure 14. Consolidation of identical small districts 
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Figure 15. Consolidation of differing small districts 
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opportunity boundary is the before-consolidation boundary for 
the relatively poorer district. The next higher opportunity 
boundary is the after-consolidation boundary for that same 
district. The highest boundary is the after-consolidation 
opportunity boundary for a district with a higher income than 
the poorer district. If consolidation occurs between these 
two districts each district would prefer a level of 
educational service that maximizes their utility. However, 
only one community can attain their utility maximizing level 
of service. In a "majority rules" world the district with the 
most voters could choose its optimal level of service and 
impose that level on the other district. The smaller district 
would not be at its utility maximum in terms of level of 
service or spending on education. In fact, because the 
smaller district cannot choose its level of education it is 
possible that the consolidation could make it worse off. 
In Iowa, before consolidation can occur, each district 
must approve it. If it is approved, over the long run the 
decisions of the consolidated district are made jointly. In 
other words, the smaller district can exercise its veto power 
only once and that is at the time of the "consolidate-or-not-
consolidate" decision. This could be one reason so many 
districts are resistant to consolidation. 
The second case of interest is the case where the 
districts are reasonably close in enrollment to the location 
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of the technical efficiency locus. In this case the 
consolidation is again a movement from one constrained level 
of enrollment to another. Figure 16 illustrates the two 
constrained opportunity boundaries. In Chapter 3 it was noted 
that the boundary that was associated with the larger 
enrollment constraint was ambiguous. However, since the 
technical efficiency locus has been estimated to be downward 
sloping, the constrained boundary associated with Ne must 
represent a higher enrollment level than the one associated 
with Ni. 
If this is the case, even if the two districts are 
identical in every way consolidation may not be beneficial. 
In general, consolidation would be more likely to be 
beneficial when the districts are providing relatively low 
levels of service and harmful when the districts are providing 
high levels of service; because, at low levels of service, the 
constrained opportunity boundary associated with the higher 
level of enrollment is above the boundary associated with 
smaller districts and below the small district's boundary at 
high levels of service. In addition, this seems reasonable 
since moving from a small size to a larger size is more likely 
to move a high-service district away from the technical 
efficiency locus and a low-service district toward it. 
If the districts differ in terms of income, property 
valuation, state aid, or preferences it becomes even more 
67 
X 
r 
X 
Fig\ire 16. Consolidation of identical near-TEL districts 
X 
r 
X 
Figure 17. Consolidation of differing near-TEL districts 
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likely that consolidation is not optimal. Figure 17 
illustrates this situation. 
In Figure 17 three opportunity boundaries are 
illustrated. The lower two illustrate the same two,boundaries 
as in Figure 15; in addition, an after-consolidation boundary 
for a higher income district is added to show the potential 
for harm from consolidation. If the higher income district is 
the one with the majority of voters, consolidation could make 
the smaller, poorer district worse off. 
Conclusions and areas for further research 
What is the value of this study? This study has provided 
a theoretical framework for the examination of school district 
service provision. In addition, a new technique for 
determining school district quality has been explored and used 
to determine the nature of the interaction of quality and the 
structure of school district expenditures. 
More importantly, it may provide some guidance for policy 
makers in determining the potential for beneficial 
consolidation. It's been shown that consolidation is not 
necessarily beneficial even when both districts are far from 
technically efficient. In any case, consolidation is more 
likely to be beneficial the more the districts are alike. If 
consolidation is to be encouraged, changes in the rules for 
consolidating, in particular, letting the districts bargain 
for long-term guarantees may make it more likely that 
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consolidations will occur. 
More research could be done in this area. One new 
educational policy that has been recently employed by a number 
of states, including Iowa, is open enrollment. With open 
enrollment, school districts could recruit students in order 
to receive the state aid and property tax revenue associated 
with them. Under, this law, the school districts have some 
ability to get new students or to lose some they currently 
have. The model developed in Chapter 2 could be modified to 
include this possibility. 
Also, much more research could be done in the area of 
quantifying school district quality. While the index 
developed here is certainly different and hopefully better 
than what came before, it could be improved upon, especially 
if better data were collected by the agencies concerned with 
education. 
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APPENDIX 
Descriptive statistics by quality level 
Table A1 presents the mean, standard deviation, and range 
for average daily membership, average expenditure, and quality 
index for each of the five quality levels. As quality level 
decreases, the mean average daily membership increases and the 
mean average expenditure decreases. Also, while the smallest 
district in each quality level is about 100 in ADM, the 
largest district increases as quality level decreases, except 
between quality level 2 and quality level 3. 
Estimation of average expenditure curves--a more general model 
A fourth more general model was used to estimate average 
expenditure curves by quality level. The results of this 
estimation are presented in Table A2. The minima of the 
average expenditure curves increases as the quality level 
decreases from level 2 to level 5. The minimum for quality 
level 1 is slightly larger than level 2 or 3 but is smaller 
than that of quality level 4 or 5. 
Compared to Model 1 in Chapter 5 the minima have the same 
general trend. However, the minima seem to occur at somewhat 
smaller levels of ADM in the more general model. Given the 
flatness of both sets of average expenditure curve estimates 
near their minima, the difference in minima is neither 
surprising nor of much consequence. In addition, the 
explanatory power of the fourth model is not much greater, as 
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signified by , than the first model. The coefficient on the 
quadratic term is not significantly greater than zero, at the 
.05 level, for quality level 1 and 4. 
Finally, the conclusions drawn in Chapter 6 remain the 
same regardless of the functional form used. Model 4 does, 
however, indicate that the technical efficiency locus might 
lie a bit further to the left than indicated by Model 1. 
Table Al. Descriptive statistics by quality level 
Quality level 1 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Ranee 
ADM 589 392 99-2019 
Average Expenditure 3272 472 2618-5887 
Quality Index 42 . 54 .40 42.01-43.78 
Quality level 2 
ADM 653 457 76-2558 
Average Expenditure 3174 625 2597-6963 
Quality Index 41.74 , 14 41.51-41.99 
Quality level 3 
ADM 740 480 85-2139 
Average Expenditure 3051 432 2534-6373 
Quality Index 41.26 . 14 41.01-41.49 
Quality level 4 
ADM 1032 1070 103-4865 
Average Expenditure 3014 323 2610-4417 
Quality Index 40. 78 . 15 40.50-40.99 
Quality level 5 
ADM 2483 4820 101-30132 
Average Expenditure 2992 300 2485-4148 
Quality Index 39. 52 4.22 25.61-40.49 
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Table A2. OLS estimates of average expenditure curves for a 
general model (t-values in parentheses) 
Quality Level 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
ADM .90 1.42 1.30 . 12 . 08 
(1.80) (5.29) (3.92) (1.25) (5.24) 
ADMI 311500 387740 348950 179670 134860 
(8.37 ) (17.83) (11.14) (8.09) (8.49) 
ADMSQ - .00021 -.00038 - . 00042 - .00001 -.00001 
(-.93) (-3.58) (-3.05) (-.32) (-3.18) 
Constant 2061 1545 1700 2481 2565 
(7.53) (9.67) (8.45) (23.18) (46.04) 
R2 .70 . 85 .69 . 58 . 50 
Minimum 722 645 695 1139 1366 
